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OPINION OF THE COURT

FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Defendants Darius Fullmer, Andrew Stepanian, Kevin
Kjonaas, Joshua Harper, Lauren Gazzola, Jacob Conroy, and
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (“SHAC”) collectively
challenge their convictions for conspiracy to violate the Animal
Enterprise Protection Act (“AEPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2002).
Notably, our interpretation of this statute is an issue of first
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impression in this, or any, circuit court of appeal.1
SHAC, Kjonaas, Gazzola, and Conroy also challenge
their convictions for conspiracy to commit interstate stalking, as
well as three substantive counts of stalking. Finally, SHAC,
Kjonaas, Gazzola, Conroy, and Harper challenge their
convictions for conspiracy to use a telecommunications device
to abuse, threaten, and harass.
The overarching issues in this appeal are whether the
AEPA violates the First Amendment, whether there was
sufficient evidence to convict Defendants of the various charges
against them, and challenges to the jury instructions. Because
we find that the AEPA is neither unconstitutional on its face, nor
unconstitutional as-applied to SHAC, Kjonaas, Gazzola,
Conroy, Stepanian, Harper and Fullmer, we will affirm their
convictions for conspiracy to violate the AEPA. In addition, we
find that there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendants on
all charges involving interstate stalking. Finally, we find no
flaw in the jury instructions, and we will therefore affirm the
Judgment of the District Court in all other respects.
I.
We begin by setting forth the two principle statutes
implicated by the lengthy facts of this case:
The version of
the AEPA in force at the time of the conduct at issue provided,
in relevant part
Whoever–
(1) travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or
uses or causes to be used the mail or any facility
in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose
of causing physical disruption to the functioning
of an animal enterprise; and
(2) intentionally damages or causes the loss of any

1

Congress revised the AEPA in 2006 to make clear that
threats of vandalism, harassment, and intimidation against third
parties that are related to or associated with animal enterprises
are themselves substantive violations of the AEPA.
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property (including animals or records) used by
the animal enterprise, or conspires to do so,
shall be punished as provided for in subsection
(b).
18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1)-(2) (2002). The interstate stalking statute
provides, in relevant part
Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce
. . . with the intent to kill, injure, harass, or place
under surveillance with intent to kill, injure,
harass, or intimidate another person, and in the
course of, or as a result of, such travel places that
person in reasonable fear of the death of, or
serious bodily injury to, or causes substantial
emotional distress to that person, a member of the
immediate family . . . of that person, or the spouse
or intimate partner of that person . . . shall be
punished as provided in section 2261(b) of this
title.
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1) (2000).
A.
Huntingdon Life Sciences (“Huntingdon”) is a research
corporation that performs testing for companies seeking to bring
their products to market. The testing that Huntingdon provides
to its clients is mandated by the laws and regulations of the
United States and Europe to ensure the safety and efficacy of
pharmaceuticals, agricultural products, veterinary products, and
medical implants. Huntingdon has three laboratories, two in the
United Kingdom and one in New Jersey. All Huntingdon
laboratories use animals as test subjects. Approximately eightyfive percent of the animals used by Huntingdon are rats and
mice, and the remaining fifteen percent is composed of other
species, including fish, dogs, monkeys, and guinea pigs.
In the late 1990s, an individual posing as a laboratory
technician videotaped the conditions inside a Huntingdon
laboratory in the United Kingdom. The footage, which depicted
animal abuse, became public when it was used in a television
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program, igniting protests against Huntingdon by a number of
animal rights organizations. At about the same time, Stop
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty was formed in the United Kingdom
(“SHAC-UK”).
The organization’s mission is to close
Huntingdon laboratories.2
Immediately after SHAC-UK formed in November 1999,
the organization published a newsletter that listed the names and
addresses of the Huntingdon directors in the United Kingdom.
Following the publication of the newsletter, animals rights
protestors subjected the Huntingdon directors to an ongoing
campaign of harassment, including vandalizing their homes and
cars.
In February 2001, the Chief Operating Officer and
Managing Director of Huntingdon, Brian Cass, was physically
assaulted by three masked individuals in front of his home in
England. Cass suffered cracked ribs, several lacerations, and a
four-inch gash on his head that required nine stitches. David
Blinkinsopp, who had been identified in video footage of
SHAC-UK protests in front of Huntingdon, was convicted of the
assault. The remaining two assailants were never identified.
SHAC-UK’s campaign evolved to include companies and
individuals who were associated with Huntingdon, such as
suppliers and customers. In addition, SHAC-UK began to target
Huntingdon’s shareholders, demanding that the shareholders sell
their stock in Huntingdon or face twenty-four hour
demonstrations at their homes. Because the laws in the United
Kingdom require companies to publish the names and addresses
of their shareholders, Huntingdon relocated its financial base to
the United States in an effort to protect its shareholders. SHAC
then formed a branch in the United States to target the New
Jersey-based branch of Huntingdon. The New Jersey branch of
SHAC is one of the Defendants in this action.

2

The activities of SHAC-UK are relevant to this case only
to the extent that they explain the state of mind and perceptions
of those targeted by Defendants in this case. SHAC-UK is not
a party to this action.
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B.
SHAC’s campaign was multi-faceted in its approach,
targeting companies that were directly and indirectly involved
with Huntingdon, as well as the people who worked for those
companies.3 Because of the length of the record, we recount
only a representative sample of the incidents that are the subject
of this case. In particular, we discuss the general content of
SHAC’s website and the protest activity coordinated through the
SHAC website, including protests directed at specific
individuals.
SHAC Website
SHAC’s primary organizing tool is its website, through
which members coordinate future protests. It also publishes
information about protests that have previously taken place.
The website includes a page dedicated to the concept of
“direct action,” which all parties concede is a type of protest that
includes the illegal activity in this case. With regard to its
position on the use of direct action, SHAC stated the following
on its website:
We operate within the boundaries of the law, but
recognize and support those who choose to

3

The record reflects that SHAC targeted at least ten
different companies and their employees during the course of its
campaign to close Huntingdon. These companies include
Spencer Edwards Inc., which facilitated the trade of Huntingdon
stock; Focal Communications, Huntingdon’s telephone and
internet service provider; Stephens, Inc., an investment banking
company that loaned money to Huntingdon; Forest Laboratories,
a pharmaceutical company and Huntingdon client; Bank of New
York, which facilitated stock purchases by American investors
when Huntingdon was based in England; Quilcap, an investment
fund management company; Marsh, Inc., which provided
insurance brokerage services to Huntingdon; Chiron, a
biopharmaceutical company and client of Huntingdon; Deloitte
and Touche, Huntingdon’s auditor; and Charles Schwab, a
stockbroker for Huntingdon.
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operate outside the confines of the legal system.
Big business has shown time and time again their
lack of concern for ethics, instead focusing their
attention on their profit. Often, simply targeting
said business proves fruitless. However, as above
ground activists have successfully targeted
[Huntingdon]’s financial pillars of support,
underground activists have too targeted
[Huntingdon]’s pocketbooks.
Unidentified
individuals as well as underground cells of the
Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation
Front have engaged in economic sabotage of
[Huntingdon] and their associates.
They have also spent their time directly
intervening and liberating the animals who are
slated to die inside of [Huntingdon]. Animals
have been liberated from breeders as well as the
laboratories themselves.
SHAC does not organize any such actions or have
any knowledge of who is doing them or when
they will happen, but [SHAC] encourage[s]
people to support direct action when it happens
and those who may participate in it.
(J.A. at 775.)
The website often posted the organization’s
“accomplishments,” which lauded both legal and illegal protest
activity. The illegal activity included, among other things, a
break-in at the Huntingdon lab in New Jersey, during which
protestors broke windows and “liberated 14 beagles,” in addition
to overturning a worker’s car; detonating a “stink bomb” in the
Seattle office of a Huntingdon investor; destroying Bank of New
York ATMs, windows, and other property; sinking a yacht
owned by the Bank of New York’s president; launching
repeated “paint attacks” in the New York offices of a
Huntingdon investor; and “rescuing” dogs and ferrets from a
Huntingdon breeder farm.
The website also posted “anonymous” bulletins of
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successful, but illegal, protest activities. One such bulletin
stated
Late last night, August 30th, we paid a visit to the
home of Rodney Armstead, MD and took out two
of his front windows . . . gave him something to
labor over this Labor Day weekend. Rodney
serves as an officer and agent of service for
“Medical Diagnostic Management, Inc.,” a
scummy little company [associated with
Huntingdon]. Any ties with [Huntingdon] or its
executives will yield only headaches and a mess
to clean up.
(J.A. at 935.) The name and home address of Dr. Armstead
followed. This bulletin was prefaced by SHAC’s statement that
it was “excited to see such an upswing in action against
Huntingdon and their cohorts. From the unsolicited direct
action to the phone calls, e-mails, faxes and protests. Keep up
the good work!” Similar bulletins included photographs of
extensive vandalism at the homes of people indirectly affiliated
with Huntingdon, such as employees of Bank of New York.
These bulletins almost always contained a disclaimer that “all
illegal activity is done by anonymous activists who have no
relation with SHAC.” (J.A. at 1233.)
The SHAC website also posted a piece called the “Top
20 Terror Tactics” that was originally published by an
organization that defends the use of animals in medical research
and testing. With its standard disclaimer about SHAC not
organizing illegal activity, SHAC re-published the list on its
website. Some of the tactics included abusive graffiti, posters,
and stickers on houses, cars, and in neighborhoods of targeted
individuals; invading offices, damaging property, and stealing
documents; chaining gates shut or blocking gates with old cars
to trap staff on site; physical assaults against the targeted
individuals, as well as their partners, including spraying cleaning
fluid into their eyes; smashing windows in houses when the
occupants are home; flooding houses with a hose attached to an
outside tap inserted through a letterbox or window while the
home is unoccupied; vandalizing personal vehicles by gluing
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locks, slashing tires, and pouring paint on the exterior; smashing
personal vehicles with a sledgehammer while the targeted
individual is inside; firebombing cars, sheds and garages; bomb
threats to instigate evacuations; threatening telephone calls and
letters, including threats to injure or kill the targeted individual,
as well their children and partners; abusive telephone calls and
letters; ordering goods and services in the targeted individual’s
name and address; and arranging for an undertaker to collect the
target’s body. Following the list, the SHAC website stated,
“Now don’t go getting any funny ideas!” (J.A. at 780.)
The website had a series of links dedicated to educating
activists on how to evade investigators. These links were
entitled, “Ears and Eyes Everywhere,” “Dealing with
Interrogation,” “When an Agent Knocks,” and “Illegal
Activity.” In these sections of the website, SHAC advised its
protesters to “never say anything over the phone, email or in
your house or car that you wouldn’t want the authorities to hear.
If you need to discuss sensitive information, do it in a remote
location. Burn anything with sensitive information on it . . . .
Visit www.pgp.com and download an email encryption program
to protect your email conversations.” (J.A. at 1512.) “PGP”
stands for “pretty good privacy,” and that encryption device was
generally effective at protecting e-mail conversations from
outside monitoring. (J.A. at 3095-99.) PGP is also used to erase
data from hard drives. The software was found on eight of the
nine computers at SHAC’s de facto headquarters where three
Defendants also lived.
Through its website, SHAC also invited its supporters to
engage in electronic civil disobedience against Huntingdon and
various companies associated with Huntingdon. Electronic civil
disobedience involves a coordinated campaign by a large
number of individuals to inundate websites, e-mail servers, and
the telephone service of a targeted company. Electronic civil
disobedience also includes the use of “black faxes,” repeatedly
faxing a black piece of paper to the same fax machine to exhaust
the toner or ink supply. SHAC sponsored monthly electronic
civil disobedience campaigns on the first Monday of every
month. SHAC reminded its supporters that electronic civil
disobedience is illegal, so supporters should only participate if
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they “are like Martin Luther King and are ready to suffer the
consequences . . . or if [the supporters] want to live to fight
another day, do the electronic civil disobedience from a public
computer that cannot be traced . . . .” (J.A. at 835.)
Another way that SHAC encouraged the use of electronic
civil disobedience was through its “Investor of the Week”
feature, which highlighted a company associated with
Huntingdon by publishing the company’s contact information.
SHAC told its supporters to “Take advantage of pay phones!
Especially with toll free numbers! [sic]” (J.A. at 788.) The
website also provided a link to a black fax for their personal use.
Alternatively, the website noted that supporters could just use
black paper to “give your target’s fax machine a run for its
money . . . or ink!” (Id.) The website explained how a
supporter could block his phone number so that it would not
appear on the fax or telephone line’s caller identification. In
addition, the website explained how to prevent the targeted
company’s servers from blocking e-mails, and provided a link
to encryption devices that mask the sender.
One specific example of SHAC’s coordination of
electronic civil disobedience was an e-mail from
“shacuse@envirolink.org” that was disseminated on October 26,
2003. The subject line of the e-mail was “Electronic Civil
Disobedience,” and it advised SHAC supporters that on the
following day, SHAC’s website would provide a link to the
SHAC-Moscow website where “electronic civil disobedience
will be taking place.” The e-mail stated that “participation is
mandatory,” and that by taking part in the coordinated electronic
civil disobedience, supporters would “help . . . halt the ever
important web medium for particular companies sponsoring
Huntingdon.” Participation would also “send[] a loud message
that no silly injunctions or crooked politicians can derail the
campaign to close Huntingdon.” (J.A. at 2615.)4

4

In addition to the website, SHAC’s newsletter provided
support for direct action against Huntingdon. One issue featured a
detailed map of Huntingdon’s physical plant, inviting readers “to
know your enemy’s physical structure.” After lauding the “liberation”
of a group of beagles from “the very plan you see below,” the
-14-

At trial, the government presented evidence that the
cyberattacks against Huntingdon caused the company’s
computer systems to crash on two separate occasions, resulting
in $400,000 in lost business, $50,000 in staffing costs to repair
the computer systems and bring them back online, and $15,000
in costs to replace computer equipment.
Protests Against Individuals
One of the strategies SHAC frequently employed was to
target the employees of Huntingdon and affiliated companies, as
well as their family members. To accomplish this goal, SHAC
posted the names, home addresses, and home phone numbers of
the individuals on the organization’s website. SHAC also
posted bulletins about what happened at the protests, including
acts of vandalism committed by protestors.
1.

Andrew Baker5

Andrew Baker is the Chairman of Life Sciences
Research, a holding company for Huntingdon. In 2000, Baker
and his family began receiving mail and phone calls at his home
in New York which he characterized as “very abusive” and
“very vulgar.” The protest activity corresponded with the
posting of the following on SHAC’s website:
“Target: Andrew Baker”:
If there is one man on whom you could place the
most blame for [Huntingdon’s] crimes since 1998,

newsletter encouraged readers to use the map to “stand up and fight.”
(J.A. at 1704-05.)
5

The protests against Andrew Baker are discussed here as
an example of the way in which SHAC targeted Huntingdon
employees. There were several other Huntingdon employees
who had similar experiences, including Henning Jonassen, who
worked in the Pathology Department at Huntingdon; Darioush
Dadgar, a Vice President at Huntingdon; Carol Auletta, Director
of Program Management at Huntingdon; Mark Bibi, Huntingdon
General Counsel; and Theresa Kushner, a veterinarian at
Huntingdon.
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it is him. For the last four years since he watched
little dogs getting punched in the face, Baker has
put his all into keeping Huntingdon afloat. Not an
easy job. As a trained chartered accountant Baker
is skilled at pulling the financial strings of
companies he is in charge of. . . . He currently
works out of a NJ office called Focused
HealthCare Partners LLC - which acts as a
general partner for healthcare startups . . . or
failing labs like Huntingdon. . . . Baker has been
essentially reduced to scrambling full time to save
Huntingdon. He has nothing else going for him.
If [Focused HealthCare Partners] is the vehicle he
uses to support Huntingdon, [Focused HealthCare
Partners] is the company we must dismantle.
(J.A. at 937.)
SHAC posted a second page that was similar, this one
entitled “TARGET: Focused Health Care Partners.” (J.A. at
949.) This page listed the names and home addresses of several
officers and employees of Focused Health Care Partners,
including Andrew Baker. It also listed his wife’s name.
There were frequent protests at Baker’s home, including
a painting of Baker’s likeness on the sidewalk in front of his
apartment building with a cross through his face. After one of
these protests, the following post appeared on the SHAC
website:
Forwarded from NY activists as part of the NY
“March Mayhem” events:
...
Despite driving winds, rain, and cold weather 75+
activists gathered at [address redacted] to protest
the home of Andrew Baker CEO to Huntingdon.
Andrew Baker is at the top of our “SH&)%^!” list
for his lead in trying to save Huntingdon from
certain closure. This was the largest and angriest
of the 3 days of protest. . . . Andrew you and all
your senior management and “science” staff have
-16-

no idea what we have in store for you!
Murderers, lairs [sic], thieves, and perverts
deserve to be treated as such. In the near future
when we see you in the gutter stripped of all your
riches and fabricated respect, the only handout
you will get is our spit!
(J.A. at 922.) Baker testified that protestors also targeted his
daughter’s New York apartment. He stated that vandals
“plastered” the front door of her apartment “with posters and
pictures . . . depicting [his] death.” (J.A. at 2834.)
A few weeks later, the SHAC website included a page
entitled “Baker’s Bloody Bungalow.” (J.A. at 923.) The page
warned, “You can run, but you can’t hide!” and included photos
of Baker’s Los Angeles home from the street, as well as the
complete street address and home phone number. The page also
included the following commentary:
So, apparently Andy is bi-coastal (as if you
couldn’t tell). In addition to the 2 million dollar
penthouse apartment he owns on NYC’s upper
Westside ([address redacted]), Baker also has a
sunny California home in Los Angeles. This
choice location on Sunset Plaza Drive should be
the number one attraction on any animal rights
activist’s Hollywood star-map.
[House number redacted] is a million dollar home
located at the top of a hill looking over LA. Its
small entrance give a false appearance of being a
small abode, but it drapes back down the
mountainside several floors.
The current
occupant, when Andy is not in, is [name
redacted], Baker’s pampered stepson who rumor
has it took a liking to some of LA’s infamous
cocaine.
(J.A. at 924.) Later, the following post appeared on the SHAC
website:
Sent anonymously to aboveground activists in the
US. . . . [V]ery late on November 9th, we visited
-17-

the home of Andrew Baker, CEO of Huntingdon
and most violent American terrorist, at [address
redacted]. We spray painted messages like
“Huntingdon SCUM” and “PUPPY KILLER” all
over the garage, wall around the house, wooden
door, and sidewalk in front, so that his neighbors
will know what kind of person owns this house.
We’d like to make it very clear that we’re only
warming up. This scumbag is not welcome here.
(J.A. at 927.) The post was attributed to “ALF,” an acronym for
the “Animal Liberation Front.”
At trial, Baker testified that the house in Los Angeles has
been attacked three times. He testified that during the first
attack, the protestors kicked in the gate at the street entrance,
broke the front door, and broke two windows. During the
second attack, the protestors broke a window in the garage and
threw a smoke bomb inside. During the third attack, the
protestors threw rocks and tile over the wall, hitting the top and
sides of the house, including windows and doors.
2.

Sally Dillenback

Sally Dillenback is the senior executive in the Dallas
office of Marsh, Inc., an insurance brokerage company that
provided services to Huntingdon. She testified that in early
2002, she learned that SHAC had targeted Marsh. In March
2002, Dillenback checked the SHAC website after learning that
personal information about employees had been posted there.
When she viewed the website, she saw that her personal
information had been posted, including the names of her
husband and her children, as well as their home address, the
name of her children’s school, the make, model and license plate
of their personal vehicle, the name of their church, and the name
of the country club where they were members.
Shortly after the information appeared on the SHAC
website, Dillenback testified that her family began receiving
phone calls, often “angry and belligerent,” day and night, as well
as a “tremendous” volume of mail. Dillenback testified that one
morning, her family awoke to find that pictures of mutilated
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animals had been glued to the sidewalk in front of her home, as
well as the exterior side wall of her home. At the same time, the
following was posted on the SHAC website:
received anonymously on March 10:
Last night the homes of Dallas Marsh employees
Michael Rogan and Sally Dillenback were visited
by activists. Mr. Rogan’s garage was plastered
with stickers of mutilated puppies such as those
his company insures. Mrs. Dillenback’s side wall
was covered in stickers, as was her mailbox.
Let the stickers serve to remind Marsh employees
and their neighbors that their homes are paid for
in blood, the blood of innocent animals that are
killed in labs like Huntingdon. Every day that
Marsh insures Huntingdon, they insure death.
(J.A. at 1292.) Dillenback testified that after this incident, she
was “sickened and terrified,” and that her children were scared,
especially the youngest child who was seven years old at the
time. Marsh provided 24-hour security at her home following
this incident.
Dillenback also received an e-mail that she perceived as
a direct threat to her youngest son. She testified that the e-mail
asked how she would feel “if they cut open my son . . . and filled
him with poison the way that [Huntingdon] was doing to
animals . . . .” (J.A. at 3004.) She testified that this e-mail
“devastated” her. She further testified that during this period of
time, her husband purchased a semi-automatic weapon and that
her seven-year-old son twice brandished a kitchen knife while
inside the house in an effort to protect himself and the family.
After Dillenback initially testified regarding her son’s use
of the knife at her deposition, the following posting, attributed
to “TX activists,” appeared on the SHAC website:
On Saturday, December 14, activists paid a
holiday visit to Sally Dillenback, head of Dallas
Marsh office. She was surprised, finding her
working on her Christmas tree with her family. .
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. . Contrary to Sally’s sworn testimony at her
deposition, her son did not run for a kitchen knife
and to hide when he saw the activists. Instead, he
and his sister seemed quite interested in the signs
and appeared to be trying to read them from
across the street.
Merry Christmas, Sally. Take a moment to think
of all the dogs, like the one who shares your
home, who will be spending Christmas in their
own congealed blood and feces at Huntingdon,
thanks in part [to] your company’s insurance.
(J.A. at 1271.)
Dillenback testified that the protests stopped in early
2003, when Marsh stopped providing insurance brokerage
services to Huntingdon. Notably, the SHAC website quoted a
Financial Times article explaining that Marsh had dropped
Huntingdon as a client on December 18, 2002.
3.

Marion Harlos

Marion Harlos heads the San Antonio office of Seabury
and Smith, a subsidiary of Marsh, Inc. As with Dillenback, she
learned from corporate headquarters that she had been targeted
for protests on the SHAC website, which listed her home
address and phone number. Within a week, there was a protest
at Harlos’s office. Protestors “bashed” in the door and threw
pamphlets across the office while screaming, “You have the
blood of death on your fingers,” “We know where you live,”
“You cannot sleep at night,” and “We will find you.” (J.A. at
2993.) Seabury and Smith subsequently hired security guards
for the San Antonio office.
Harlos testified that the protestors returned to the office
a few weeks later. Although the security guard stopped most of
the protestors, one made it inside, throwing pamphlets and
screaming, “Puppy killer,” and “We know where you live.”
(J.A. at 2994.) This protest was memorialized on the SHAC
website as follows:
Today around 11:30 am, 5 activists visited the
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San Antonio Marsh office . . . and gained access
to the lobby.
They rang the bell and a security guard answered,
one activist made an attempt to get in past the
guard and got half way in. It was enough to throw
two or three dozen anti Huntingdon flyers into the
air scattering and landing into the cubicles. All of
the activist[s] screamed “puppy killer” and “we
won’t stop [until] you drop Huntingdon”. As they
left they banged on the windows and promised
“next time we will be at your HOME”.
(J.A. at 1282.)
Harlos testified that after this protest, she began receiving
phone calls at her home late at night. She stated that sometimes
the caller asked, “Are you scared? Do you think the puppies
should be scared?” (J.A. at 2994.) Protestors, wearing
bandanas and masks to conceal their faces, often sat in a car
outside her residence between 4:00 A.M. and 6:00 A.M.,
watching her house. Then, protests began. One morning, nine
activists were arrested outside Harlos’s home and were charged
with third-degree stalking. The SHAC website announced the
arrests and urged its protestors to call the local police
department in Texas to demand the protestors’ release.
Harlos testified that she was “petrified” and frightened
for her children, who were no longer permitted to play outside.
(J.A. at 2995.) She also testified that her fear stemmed, in part,
from her knowledge of what had happened to others who had
been targeted by SHAC, including physical attacks. The
activists continued to trespass on her property, despite an
injunction that was intended to limit the permissible bounds of
the protests. Harlos testified that the protests had a profound
effect on her life, and the life of her family, ultimately forcing
her to move to a new home. As with Dillenback, Harlos
testified that the protests ceased when Marsh ended its business
relationship with Huntingdon.
4.

Robert Harper

Robert Harper is a property broker in Marsh’s Boston
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office. In April 2002, his home address appeared on the SHAC
website, and protests at his home began shortly thereafter. The
protestors also engaged in other harassing activities, such as
submitting an unauthorized mail-forwarding order to the United
States Postal Service and posting advertisements for cars or
concert tickets, listing Harper’s home number. On Father’s Day
2002, activists threw red paint on his front door. The following
post subsequently appeared on the SHAC website:
Received anonymously:
Happy Father[’]s [D]ay Rob Harper. I hope you
liked our gift[.]
In the wee hours of the mourning (sic) on June 15,
Marsh Boston Employee, Rob Harper [home
address redacted] received an early Father[’]s Day
gift that he will never forget. A few gallons of
red paint were thrown all over Harper’s front
steps and door. This left the front of his house
caked in a huge pool of red paint.
Rob Harper is responsible for 500 animals dying
within [Huntingdon] today and as long as Marsh
has ties with [Huntingdon], Marsh will be a
target. This also goes for any other company or
business that has times [sic] with Huntingdon they will pay for it.
There will be no rest for these murders.
[Huntingdon] will be closed.
This action is dedicated to the 500 animals that
were murdered inside of [Huntingdon] today.
Love,
The Animal Liberation Front
(J.A. at 1225 (emphasis in original).)
Harper testified that after these protests began, his
workday was “consumed” with checking the SHAC website. He
testified that he became aware of other protests and other
targets, including the physical assault of Brian Cass in the
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United Kingdom, as well as protestors destroying vehicles. He
stated that this made him feel “vulnerable” and “concerned for
his family,” as well as angry and helpless because his life was so
profoundly disrupted. (J.A. at 2979-80.)
On August 9, 2002, Harper was at work when a protest
occurred at his home. His wife called him, crying and frantic.
He arrived home to find his wife and two-year-old son upset.
The protestors outside were screaming “puppy killer” and
threatening to burn the house down. A video played at trial
showed that Lauren Gazzola, a Defendant in this case, was
present at this demonstration, shouting into a bullhorn,
Where were the police when a [Huntingdon]
worker’s car got flipped over in his driveway?
Where were the police when a Marsh executive
had all his windows smashed in and his house
covered in red paint in Chicago? And where were
the police when your house was covered in red
paint a few weeks ago? They can’t protect you.
Your injunctions can’t stop us. We’ll always find
a way around whatever they throw at us.
(G.E. 4006; J.A. at 2980 & 2985; Appellee’s Br. at 65-66.)
Harper testified that this was “one of the worst days of [his]
life.” (J.A. at 2980.) He feared that someone would “throw a
molotov cocktail” into the house, or that someone would
physically assault him or his family. (J.A. at 2981.) He
contemplated moving and quitting his job, but the protests
stopped when Marsh ended its business relationship with
Huntingdon.
C.
The Individual Defendants
In addition to SHAC, this case involves the following
individual Defendants who participated in protest activity on
behalf of the organization.
1.

Kevin Kjonaas

Kevin Kjonaas was the President of SHAC. Kjonaas
lived at SHAC’s Somerset, New Jersey, headquarters with two
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co-Defendants, Lauren Gazzola and Jacob Conroy.
Kjonaas’s work on the campaign began in the United
Kingdom. At trial, the government played a video of Kjonaas
speaking at a workshop in Little Rock, Arkansas, about the
origins of SHAC’s campaign against Huntingdon. He described
a series of campaigns in England, dating back to 1996, that
inspired SHAC’s efforts. Those campaigns incorporated both
legal and illegal tactics to shut down various animal-related
enterprises.
He described demonstrations during which
protestors tore down fences surrounding the targeted facilities,
and broke into buildings to “liberate” the animals kept inside.
He relayed the early organizers’ frustration with “the police
trying to prevent [them] from doing what was right,” and how
those early organizers “pushed the police aside, . . . opened up
the fences, [and] took the animals out.” (J.A. at 1830.) He
described footage of another protest during which the
demonstrators threw so many rocks onto the roof of one facility
that the roof caved in, and every window in the building was
smashed. Kjonaas described this as “one of the funniest things
[he had] ever seen.” (J.A. at 1833.) He described another
protest where the demonstrators arrived at a targeted facility,
which was also someone’s home, and tore down newly-erected
security fences, disconnected newly-installed security cameras,
broke car windows, kicked in the front door, and evacuated the
animals.
Although SHAC often attributed illegal activity to other
organizations or anonymous sources, the government presented
evidence that Defendants coordinated, directed and personally
participated in the illegal acts. Here, we recount a sample of
specific instances that demonstrate Kjonaas’s involvement, in
chronological order.
In the fall of 2000, a website called
www.stephenskills.com was published online. The website
explained that Stephens, an investor with Huntingdon, had
provided a financial “bailout” for the lab. Under a heading
labeled “Consequences,” the site stated,
We must show all other financial institutions via
our actions against Stephens Incorporated that
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having any financial connections to Huntingdon
will mean blocked up phone lines, flooded e-mail
systemse [sic] and mailboxes, demonstrations
outside and inside of offices, protests at the
homes of the CEO’s [sic] and company Directors
....
(J.A. at 2861.) At trial, a Stephens employee testified that these
threats became a reality in the fall of 2000. In January 2001, the
Stephens employee met with Kjonaas at Kjonaas’s request. As
a pre-condition, Stephens asked Kjonaas to remove
www.stephenskills.com from the internet. A few days later, the
website was down. During their meeting, the two sides “agreed
to disagree” about Huntingdon. Shortly thereafter, Stephens
was targeted by a massive direct action campaign that included
a “virtual sit-in,” a protest that involved hundreds of activists
attempting to access Stephens’s website simultaneously and
repeatedly in an effort to shut it down. Approximately 1,300
people participated in this virtual sit-in, which resulted in major
disruptions to Stephens’s day-to-day business operations.
When two members of the Huntingdon Board of
Directors resigned in January 2003, Kjonaas led the effort to
obtain the identities of the new directors so that SHAC could
disseminate their personal information in order to target them.
The record contains dozens of pages of transcribed phone calls
between Kjonaas and various individuals that demonstrate his
intense effort to obtain this information.
In a February 2003 phone call, Kjonaas discusses how
“awesome” it was that a company had severed ties with
Huntingdon only ten days after the protests began. Kjonaas
explained that the campaign against Marsh had been an example
of what would have happened if the target did not end its
relationship with Huntingdon. Kjonaas stated, “It’s like how we
beat Quilcap too.” 6 (J.A. at 2240.)

6

Quilcap was an investor in Huntingdon. In 1998, SHAC
posted the home address and phone number of Quilcap’s
president, Parker Quillen, on SHAC’s website. Quillen and his
family began receiving harassing phone calls and mail at home.
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In an e-mail exchange dated March 3, 2003, two
members of SHAC discussed “resurrecting” the Animal Defense
League of New Jersey (“ADL-NJ”) for the purpose of
attributing future protest activity to the organization in lieu of
crediting the protests to SHAC. In the e-mail, Kjonaas told coDefendant Darius Fullmer that using ADL-NJ is better than
“making up other silly little groups that are going to be bound by
. . . injunctions.” Kjonaas added that “SHAC is supposed to be
a national ‘communications’ group and cannot . . . take
responsibility” for future protest events. (J.A. at 2612.)
In August 2003, a bomb exploded at the California
offices of Chiron, Inc., a pharmaceutical company that was a
Huntingdon client. SHAC posted a bulletin on its website
announcing the explosion, stating that a group called “The
Revolutionary Cells” claimed responsibility. In the post,
Kjonaas was quoted as saying, “[T]his action against Chiron
marks a drastic escalation in severity. Although SHAC-USA
may share the same passion for ending injustice and closing
Huntingdon, we know nothing more about ‘The Revolutionary
Cells’ and their intentions. If I were Huntingdon or Chiron, I
would be very worried.” (J.A. at 1550.) Less than twelve hours
after the bomb detonated, telephone records show that Kjonaas
called Daniel Andreas San Diego, the man later charged with the
bombing.

Some of the phone calls were of a threatening nature, including
ultimatums that if Quilcap did not stop investing in Huntingdon,
someone would harm his children. Protestors also vandalized
his home, throwing paint on it and breaking windows. There
were also a number of protests in front of his home. On
February 13, 2002, someone named “Lauren James” called
Quillen’s office and said that if Quilcap would “put something
in writing” that it no longer had an interest in Huntingdon, then
“Lauren’s group w[ould] call off the campaign of harassment.”
(J.A. at 2955.) Quillen then directed Quilcap to divest itself of
Huntingdon shares, and a notice appeared on the SHAC website,
directing its activists to turn their attention to other targets
because SHAC “had received a credible tip” that Quilcap was
no longer involved with Huntingdon. (J.A. at 2955.)
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2.

Lauren Gazzola

Lauren Gazzola was the Campaign Coordinator for
SHAC. She also lived at SHAC headquarters. In addition to
coordinating protests on SHAC’s behalf, Gazzola was
personally involved in protests against targeted companies and
individuals, including the protests against Marsh employee
Robert Harper and a bombing of a Marsh subsidiary in Seattle.
The record reflects that several activists called to
congratulate Gazzola after Marsh severed its relationship with
Huntingdon. During a phone call with an incarcerated SHAC
supporter, Gazzola talked about the successful protests against
Marsh, saying “we fucked them up . . . then they pulled out.”
(J.A. at 1935 (emphasis added).) As previously noted, Gazzola
was videotaped participating in the protest of Robert Harper’s
home. During this protest she threatened to burn Harper’s house
down and warned that the police could not protect him or his
family.
In July 2002, the Seattle offices of Guy Carpenter, a
subsidiary of Marsh, were targeted with smoke bombs. The
offices are located in two buildings, each with over twenty
floors, which were evacuated after the bombs were detonated.
Witnesses testified to “pandemonium” and “chaos” during the
incident, in which at least 700 people, some with disabilities,
were led down the stairs and into the street as the fire alarms
sounded. Following the incident, SHAC posted the following
statement on its website:
Marsh and Guy Carpenter got smoked out of their
holes today by alleged anonymous activists. Two
whole buildings apparently were evacuated after
becoming the target of military style smoke
grenades, as one channel reported. As George W.
Bush stated, we need to smoke these terrorists out
of their holes. Insuring the murder of 500 animals
every day is not acceptable. Note: As reported by
some media outlets, SHAC is not affiliated with
the attack, although we do support direct action as
long as it does not hurt any animal, human, or
nonhuman. We do not engage in, organize, or
fund such activities. However, we do applaud
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those brave enough to do so.
(J.A. at 3010.) Videos of newscasts covering the bombing were
subsequently found during a search of SHAC headquarters.
The day after the bombing, July 11, 2002, Lauren
Gazzola, under the pseudonym “Angela Jackson,” appeared on
a Seattle-based radio talk show to defend the bombings. During
the interview, Gazzola refused to condemn the beating of Brian
Cass in the United Kingdom, stating,
[I]t’s hard to judge what you’re going to do when
you’re in that situation, what would those animals
do, I think they would fight back . . . against the
individual that is attacking him or her. . . .
[P]eople that [sic] sympathize with those animals
who cannot take that one themselves and they are
carrying out the actions against those people who
have the ability to stop suffering.
(J.A. at 2499-500.) With regard to the Seattle bombings,
Gazzola stated that the action was justified, noting that the
bombings were akin to “economic sabotage,” effecting a huge
disruption to Marsh and Guy Carpenter’s day-to-day
functioning, with the goal of forcing the companies to
disassociate from Huntingdon. (J.A. at 2507-08.) In response
to hostile callers who phoned in to challenge her viewpoint,
Gazzola stated that the callers merely “proved her point,”
because when something controversial happens, like the Seattle
bombings, people pay attention to the issue of animal cruelty,
whereas normal coverage in the mainstream media garners little
or no attention. (J.A. at 2510.) She also responded to criticism
by stating, “this is the most successful campaign in the history
of the animal rights movement and it’s precisely because we’re
pushing the limits and we’re tired of standing around holding
signs and yelling at buildings and writing letters and not getting
anywhere. We’re gonna do what we have to do in order to be
effective and in order to save lives.” (J.A. at 2520 (emphasis
added).)
3.

Jacob Conroy

Jacob Conroy designed and maintained SHAC’s websites
and was the third resident of SHAC’s Somerset headquarters.
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At trial, an expert testified that there were nine computers at the
headquarters. The expert testified that two of the nine were used
to “administer and publish” several web sites affiliated with
SHAC, including www.shacusa.net, www.shacamerica.net,
ww w.shacamerica.org, w w w .october29.org, and
www.december1.net. (J.A. at 2691.) Conroy was a “frequent
user” of those two computers. Other SHAC members looked to
Conroy for technical assistance, including asking Conroy to
create links on the website, and asking Conroy how to use
“Dream Weaver,” a program used to design web pages.
4.

Josh Harper

Josh Harper organized the Seattle branch of SHAC,
which coordinated a campaign against Stephens, Inc. In the fall
2002 edition of the SHAC newsletter, Josh Harper wrote an
editorial praising SHAC’s “militant” tactics. When describing
the movement’s earliest days in the United Kingdom, he noted,
“People who had spent years making money while happily
laughing at beagles being punched in the face were now having
their cars set on fire. Boo hoo.” He also stated that while
“animal abusers . . . may be safe from the cops, the army, and
the FBI . . . they are not safe from us. . . If no one else will treat
them like the criminal scum that they are, at least we will . . . .
It is time to go beyond our fear of reprisals.” (J.A. at 1696.)
Harper also gave speeches in Little Rock and Seattle, during
which he similarly praised and advocated for the use of direct
action in animal rights campaigns. The speech in Seattle
included an explanation of how to send black faxes.
5.

Andrew Stepanian

Andrew Stepanian was a SHAC activist who coordinated
protests in New York. In February 2003, Stepanian led a protest
of approximately twenty people at a New York office of Deloitte
and Touche, Huntingdon’s auditor. After security refused to
admit him to the building, Stepanian followed a pizza delivery
person inside, and asked to speak to a Deloitte employee,
Maureen Collins. When Collins arrived she asked Stepanian to
leave, to which Stepanian responded that if Deloitte refused to
talk to him, the organization would launch a “full-fledged
campaign” against the company within 48 hours. Collins called
the police, and a security guard grabbed Stepanian and escorted
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him out of the building. At that moment, the other protestors
threw flyers from a third floor balcony, showering people below.
They also chanted and plastered stickers throughout the interior
of the building. The police arrived and detained one protestor,
who later escaped. Stepanian recounted the incident in a
telephone call with Gazzola, describing the protest as “freaking
raucous” and “awe-inspiring.” He asked Gazzola to “write it
up” and disseminate it over the Internet. (J.A. at 2213-24.) The
SHAC website subsequently posted a summary of the protest at
Deloitte, attributing the report to “NY Activists.” (J.A. at 1366.)
The record also reflects that Stepanian had a substantial
role in organizing protests on behalf of SHAC, and he worked
with Kjonaas and Gazzola to coordinate the protest calendar.
For example, in a January 15, 2003 phone call, Stepanian told
Kjonaas about his strategy for a “three days of action” protest in
New York and New Jersey. When Kjonaas asked Stepanian,
“What’s gonna happen in Jersey?” Stepanian replied, “I can’t
say over the phone.” (J.A. at 2028.) When discussing
organizing a national protest, Stepanian explained that he
wanted to attribute it to an “amorphous collective” that no one
would recognize, rather than attach SHAC’s name to it. (J.A. at
2029.) He and Kjonaas agreed to discuss the matter via
encrypted e-mail.
6.

Darius Fullmer

Darius Fullmer was a Huntingdon campaign organizer in
New Jersey. At trial, the government presented evidence that
Fullmer’s e-mail address was malignantx@aol.com, which is the
same e-mail address that was often used to coordinate electronic
civil disobedience via a Yahoo message board. For example, on
August 30, 2001, Fullmer disseminated a message with the
subject line “September SHAC Calendar.” (J.A. at 851-52.)
The message listed several events for September, including
names and facsimile numbers to use for “Black Fax Mondays”
against Stephens, Inc. and Bank of New York. The record also
reflects that Fullmer researched new corporate targets as well as
the personal information of employees who worked for those
companies. He assisted Gazzola in posting this information on
the SHAC website to facilitate protests against these companies
and individuals.
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D.
Procedural History
On September 16, 2004, SHAC, Kjonaas, Gazzola,
Conroy, Harper, Stepanian, and Fullmer were charged in a
superceding indictment. Count One of the indictment charged
that all six individual defendants conspired to violate the Animal
Enterprise Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43. Count Two charged
SHAC, Kjonaas, Gazzola, and Conroy with conspiring to
commit interstate stalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)
and 18 U.S.C. § 371. Counts Three, Four, and Five charged
SHAC, Kjonaas, Gazzola, and Conroy with substantive
interstate stalking of Sally Dillenback, Marion Harlos, and
Robert Harper, respectively. Count Six charged SHAC,
Kjonaas, Gazzola, Conroy, and Harper of conspiring to use a
telecommunications device to abuse, threaten, and harass in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(c).
On March 2, 2006, following a three-week trial, a jury
convicted all Defendants on all counts. On September 12, 2006,
the District Court sentenced SHAC to five years’ probation;
Kjonaas to 72 months’ imprisonment; Gazzola to 52 months’
imprisonment; Conroy to 48 months’ imprisonment; Harper to
36 months’ imprisonment; Stepanian to 36 months’
imprisonment; and Fullmer to 12 months’ imprisonment.
Defendants filed a timely notice of appeal in this Court,
challenging both their underlying convictions and sentences.
II.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291.
III.
The threshold issue is whether the AEPA is
unconstitutional either on its face,7 or as-applied to Defendants.
7

Defendants’ overbreadth challenge is moot because the
statute was superceded by the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act
in 2006. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to address this issue.
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 582-83 (1989).
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This Court reviews challenges to the constitutionality of a
statute under a de novo standard of review. United States v.
Weatherly, 525 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir. 2008).
A.
Constitutionality of the AEPA
1.

Void for Vagueness

Defendants argue that the AEPA violates the Due Process
Clause and the First Amendment because the statute does not
clearly define prohibited conduct. Specifically, Defendants
argue that the terms “economic damage” and “physical
disruption” are not clearly defined. As a result, Defendants
argue that the statute has a chilling effect on speech because
protestors will refrain from all speech, even protected speech,
due to the ambiguity of what the statute proscribes. In addition,
Defendants argue that the vague nature of the statute allows
prosecutors to determine what conduct is covered by the statute,
inevitably permitting prosecutorial decisions based on content.
Defendants primarily argue that the goal of their political
speech was to apply pressure to Huntingdon directly, as well as
indirectly, by targeting associated companies, to force
Huntingdon to change its practices. Defendants contend that
this is an accepted and legal form of political protest protected
by the First Amendment, and that the AEPA criminalizes
protected behavior by proscribing “physical disruptions” with
the intent to cause “economic damage.” The government
counters that the AEPA excepts “lawful” disruptions, therefore
excluding all protected activity.
“A statute is void on vagueness grounds if it: (1) ‘fails to
provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to understand what conduct it prohibits’; or (2) ‘authorizes or
even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’
United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 249 (3d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)). The
inquiry is undertaken on a case-by-case basis, and a reviewing
court must determine whether the statute is vague as-applied to
the affected party. San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125,
1136 (3d Cir. 1992). “In the criminal context, the Supreme
Court has held that since vagueness attacks are based on lack of
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notice, ‘they may be overcome in any specific case where
reasonable persons would know their conduct puts [them] at
risk’ of punishment under the statute.” Id. (quoting Maynard v.
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (alteration in original)).
Therefore, for a criminal statute to be constitutional, “criminal
statutes need only give ‘fair warning’ that certain conduct is
prohibited.” Id. (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110
(1972)). “Simply because a criminal statute could have been
written more precisely does not mean the statute as written is
unconstitutionally vague.” Id. (citing United States v. Powell,
423 U.S. 87, 94 (1975)). In addition, the Supreme Court has
held that scienter requirements in criminal statutes “alleviate
vagueness concerns,” because a mens rea element makes it less
likely that a defendant will be convicted for an action that he or
she committed by mistake. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124, 149 (2007). Furthermore, facial challenges to statutes,
including challenges based on vagueness, are disfavored.
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican
Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008). The Court noted that
“facial challenges . . . run contrary to the fundamental principle
of judicial restraint that courts should neither anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The AEPA proscribes the use of an instrument of
interstate commerce with the “intent [to] damage [or] cause []
the loss of any property (including animals or records) used by
the animal enterprise . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2002) (emphasis
added). The definitions section of the AEPA states that
“‘physical disruption’ does not include any lawful disruption
that results from lawful public, governmental, or animal
enterprise employee reaction to the disclosure of information
about an animal enterprise.” 18 U.S.C. § 43(d)(2) (2002)
(emphasis added). The AEPA also defines “economic damage”
as “the replacement costs of lost or damaged property or
records, the costs of repeating an interrupted or invalidated
experiment, or the loss of profits . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 43(d)(3)
(2002).
We do not agree with Defendants that the AEPA is void
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for vagueness. First, the term “physical disruption” has a wellunderstood, common definition. Defendants argue that the term
“physical disruption” could be read to proscribe legal protest
activity, such as a letter-writing campaign, because that could be
interpreted as an intent to cause a physical disruption resulting
in economic loss to the targeted enterprise. However, the statute
provides an exception that exempts legal protest activity from
proscribed conduct. In this case, Defendants engaged in various
“direct action” campaigns, which even SHAC’s website
concedes constitute illegal activity. Therefore, Defendants
cannot argue that the statute was vague. The record is rife with
evidence that Defendants were on notice that their activities put
them at risk for prosecution, including the extensive use of
various encryption devices and programs used to erase
incriminating data from their computer hard drives. Because
Defendants’ conduct was clearly within the heartland of the
statute, speculation as to the hypothetical ways that the AEPA
could be unconstitutionally vague would require us to
“formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts” before us.
Furthermore, Defendants were charged with intending to
cause physical disruption to the functioning of an animal
enterprise and to cause economic damages exceeding $10,000.
See 18 U.S.C. § 43(b)(2) (2002). The scienter requirement
means that the government must present the trier of fact with
evidence that establishes that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
accused had the requisite intent to disrupt the functioning of an
animal enterprise. As the Supreme Court has stated, the
inclusion of the scienter requirement in the statute alleviates
vagueness concerns. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 149.
2.

As-Applied

Defendants next argue that we should reverse their
convictions for conspiracy to violate the AEPA because the
statute is unconstitutional as-applied to them. Specifically,
Defendants argue that their actions constituted political speech,
and that the SHAC website neither incited violence nor
constituted a true threat. Moreover, Defendants argue that their
protected speech cannot be converted into unprotected speech by
the independent action of others who engaged in illegal conduct.
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The government contends that the conduct underlying
Defendants’ convictions is not protected by the First
Amendment because, through the SHAC website, Defendants
knowingly and purposefully adopted illegal means, including
threats of violence and destruction of property, to achieve their
political goals. More specifically, the government argues that
the individual Defendants, via the SHAC website and their
individual actions, promoted and coordinated both lawful and
unlawful acts against Huntingdon and associated companies.
The unlawful activity was comprised of “direct action,” which
included electronic civil disobedience (e.g., sending black faxes,
crashing websites); providing the personal information of
Huntingdon employees and companies associated with
Huntingdon for the purpose of encouraging harassment,
intimidation, and threats; encouraging animal “liberation”; and
vandalizing private property. The government also argues that
the individual Defendants personally participated in illegal
protest activity.
We must first decide whether the content on the SHAC
website, the cornerstone of the government’s case, is protected
by the First Amendment. If so, the AEPA’s criminalization of
the speech on and through the website is unconstitutional.
All parties agree that the postings on the website speak to
an issue of political, moral, and ethical importance in today’s
society–the humane treatment of animals. Therefore, the issues
here fit squarely within the rubric of the First Amendment
because they contribute to the “marketplace of ideas,” as well as
educate and urge others to action. Moreover, the speech at issue
is speech that many find offensive and uncomfortable, which is
precisely the type of speech that requires First Amendment
protection. See, e.g., Terminello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S.
1, 4 (1949) (noting that speech “best serve[s] its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest . . . and stirs people to
anger”). However, provocative political speech can run afoul of
the First Amendment.
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment “do[es] not
permit [the government] to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
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directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.” Id. at 447. The Court
elaborated by stating, “the mere abstract teaching . . . of the
moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and
violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action
and steeling it to such action.” Id. at 448 (quotation marks
omitted) (alteration in original); see also United States v. Bell,
414 F.3d 474, 483 n.9 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Under Brandenburg,
only speech inciting imminent lawless action may be restricted.”
(emphasis omitted)). Therefore, for the speech at issue in this
case to fall outside the purview of the First Amendment, this
Court must determine that the speech (1) invited imminent
lawlessness and (2) that the imminent lawlessness was likely to
occur.8
However, while advocating violence that is not imminent
and unlikely to occur is protected, speech that constitutes a “true
threat” is not. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
In Watts, the Supreme Court distinguished a “true threat” from
“political hyperbole,” explaining that the latter is protected
speech, while the former is not. In deciding whether speech
constitutes a “true threat,” a court should consider the totality of
the circumstances and not just the words in isolation, whether
the threat is “conditional,” and the reaction of the listeners. Id.
(noting that the defendant’s words, “taken in context,” were
merely a “crude and offensive” method of making a political
statement and did not constitute a true threat).
In this case, the record includes hundreds of pages of
website printouts that depict screen shots of the SHAC website

8

The government argues that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), supports an
“exception” to Brandenburg’s imminent incitement requirement.
However, Virginia v. Black involved a prosecution under a
Virginia statute that banned cross-burning with only the “intent
to intimidate,” and the Supreme Court narrowed its holding to
the context of cross-burning “because burning a cross is a
particularly virulent form of intimidation,” especially in the
South. Id. at 363. Therefore, we conclude that the Virginia v.
Black analysis is not applicable in this case.
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and other websites affiliated with SHAC or administered by
SHAC’s agents. These pages demonstrate several types of
conduct which the government alleges violated the AEPA. We
can generally classify the conduct at issue as follows: “news”like postings, allegedly from anonymous sources, that report on
demonstrations after the demonstrations occurred; posts that
listed the names, addresses and phone numbers of Huntingdon
employees and the employees of associated companies; posts
that coordinated physical demonstrations, including home
demonstrations; posts coordinating electronic civil disobedience
with the goal of flooding the Huntingdon servers, fax machines
and phones, as well as those of companies affiliated with
Huntingdon, and providing a link to software that enables a user
to participate; and a post that included a reprint of a list of “Top
Twenty Terror Tactics” that includes illegal conduct.
We emphasize that much of the speech on the website
does not run afoul of the Brandenburg standard. Coordinating
demonstrations at the homes of Huntingdon employees, under
the parameters set forth in injunctions, is not unlawful.9 And
merely posting information on unlawful acts that have already
occurred, in the past, does not incite future, imminent unlawful
conduct. Moreover, the publication of the “Top Twenty Terror
Tactics,” without more, is also protected, because although it
lists illegal conduct, there is no suggestion that SHAC planned
to imminently implement these tactics.10 However, we find that
the posts that coordinate electronic civil disobedience and
disseminate the personal information of individuals employed by
Huntingdon and affiliated companies are more problematic.
Electronic civil disobedience is unlawful, as SHAC

9

The website mentions that police were often on site to
oversee the protests and to protect the targets of the protests.
10

The government attempts to connect the posting of the
“Top Twenty Terror Tactics,” which occurred on March 6,
2001, to later unlawful conduct, the earliest of which occurred
on March 31, 2001. These events occurred a minimum of three
weeks apart, which does not meet the “imminence” required by
the Brandenburg standard.
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acknowledged on its website. When SHAC’s website included
links to the tools necessary to carry out virtual sit-ins, those
posts were clearly intended to incite imminent, lawless conduct
that was likely to occur. SHAC sometimes posted ongoing
updates as virtual sit-ins progressed, noting that their efforts
were having the desired effect because the Huntingdon servers
were slowing down. As described above, an October 26, 2003,
e-mail titled “Electronic Civil Disobedience,” urged SHAC
supporters to participate in electronic civil disobedience at a
specified time. This message encouraged and compelled an
imminent, unlawful act that was not only likely to occur, but
provided the schedule by which the unlawful act was to occur.
This type of communication is not protected speech under the
Brandenburg standard.
With regard to the individual Defendants in this case,
they attribute the illegal activity of the Huntingdon protestors to
“anonymous activists” or unaffiliated organizations, and now
argue that they cannot be held responsible for the illegal acts of
others. However, there was ample evidence at trial to
demonstrate that Kjonaas, Gazzola, Conroy, Stepanian, Harper
and Fullmer coordinated and controlled SHAC’s activities, both
legal and illegal. Direct action, electronic civil disobedience,
intimidation and harassment were part and parcel of SHAC’s
overall campaign, and these individual Defendants employed
those tactics because they were effective. The record also
supports a jury inference that these individual Defendants
personally participated in illegal protests, in addition to
orchestrating the illegal acts of others. They personally took
credit for the success of the direct action campaigns as
companies discontinued their business dealings with
Huntingdon, one by one. Kjonaas and Gazzola, in particular,
worked the phones at SHAC headquarters, confirming that
various companies had severed ties with Huntingdon. As soon
as Kjonaas or Gazzola received written confirmation, the
protests stopped–strongly suggesting that they, on behalf of
SHAC, had substantial control over the entire campaign. In
addition, the individual Defendants held up the successes of the
illegal campaigns as an example to other companies they
targeted, in furtherance of their conspiracy to violate the AEPA.
Further, other conduct constituted “true threats,” which
-38-

also removes Defendants’ speech from the realm of First
Amendment protection. In particular, Defendants used past
incidents to instill fear in future targets. For example, SHAC
displayed placards with photos of Brian Cass after his beating,
with his injuries highlighted in red, at protests. Indeed, they
attributed the quick exit of some targets, such as Deloitte and
Touche, to the past experiences of employees at companies like
Stephens and Marsh. In this regard, their actions meet the
standard of a “true threat” as articulated in Watts, because
viewed in context, the speeches, protests, and web postings,
were all tools to further their effort. Moreover, given the
success of the campaign in the past, including the destruction of
private property and the telecommunication attacks on various
companies, the implied threats were not conditional, and this
speech rightly instilled fear in the listeners.
We therefore conclude that some of the speech on
SHAC’s website, viewed in context, is not protected by the First
Amendment. Likewise, we find that any Defendant who created
or disseminated that speech, or who personally participated in
illegal activity, is likewise not protected by the First
Amendment. We discuss the individual Defendants below.
a.

Kjonaas

As discussed above, Kjonaas delivered a speech at the
workshop in Little Rock, in which he praised the use of violent
techniques. While distasteful, we find that this is protected
speech. There is no evidence that the speech was intended to
incite anyone to participate in imminent and likely unlawful
action.
However, when we view the speech in
context–alongside the overwhelming evidence that Kjonaas was
deeply involved in the coordination and execution of illegal
protest activity–the speech informs us of his state of mind. We
agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Kjonaas’s
conviction for conspiring to violate the AEPA is not prohibited
by the First Amendment.
The record contains more instances of Kjonaas’s
involvement in and coordination of illegal activity than we could
possibly recount here. Suffice it to say that, as detailed above,
Kjonaas’s metaphorical fingerprints were all over several of
SHAC’s illegal activities. Perhaps the clearest example is his
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involvement with the campaign against Stephens. Prior to
Kjonaas’s meeting with the Stephens representative to discuss
Stephens’s investment with Huntingdon, the Stephens
representative asked Kjonaas to shut dow n
www.stephenskills.com, a website that encouraged electronic
civil disobedience. Within days, the website was down. After
the meeting, during which Stephens refused to stop dealing with
Huntingdon, an illegal direct action campaign against Stephens
escalated. It is equally telling that Kjonaas’s telephone records
indicate that he called the person responsible for the Chiron
bombing in Seattle hours after it happened. These are only
representative samples of Kjonaas’s direction and coordination
of the direct action campaign, but viewed in context, we do not
find that his First Amendment rights have been violated.
b.

Gazzola

One of the more incriminating pieces of evidence against
Gazzola was her participation in the demonstration at the home
of Robert Harper. The government showed a video at trial, in
which Gazzola can be heard threatening to burn down Harper’s
house and warning him that the police cannot protect him.
Under the Watts framework, this act, viewed in context with
Gazzola’s other conduct, constitutes a true threat and is
sufficient to remove her protest activity from First Amendment
protection.11
We find it hard to see how threatening to burn down
11

Gazzola was arrested and charged in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts for this specific protest
activity outside of Robert Harper’s home. The Massachusetts
court dismissed the charges on First Amendment grounds.
Gazzola’s counsel raised this issue in the District Court when he
moved for a new trial following Gazzola’s conviction in this
case. After a hearing during which both parties were fully
heard, the District Court concluded that the Massachusetts
court’s ruling was on a narrow set of facts, limited only to
Gazzola’s conduct outside Robert Harper’s home, and that the
state court did not consider the entire course of conduct,
including involvement in the website and other protests, at issue
in this case. We agree with the District Court on this issue.
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someone’s house is “political hyperbole” such that it might be
protected by the First Amendment in the first place. However,
even assuming that it has some underlying political value,
viewed in the totality of the circumstances, this constituted a
“true threat.” When this protest took place, Robert Harper and
his family had been a target of the campaign for a few weeks.
Robert Harper was keenly aware of what was happening, and
what had happened, to others who had been targeted during the
campaign to close Huntingdon, including the physical assault on
Brian Cass. He lived in fear that something similar would
happen to his family, and from the record, his fear of the
protestors acting on their threats was reasonable. Gazzola could
reasonably foresee that Harper would interpret her words as a
serious expression of intent to harm Robert Harper and his
family.
Even assuming Gazzola had not made these threats at the
Harper demonstration, the record establishes that Gazzola, like
Kjonaas, was instrumental in the planning and execution of
SHAC’s illegal activities. She repeatedly employed illegal
tactics as one of the strategies used to further SHAC’s overall
goal of closing Huntingdon.
c.

Conroy

Conroy, who designed and maintained the websites on
behalf of SHAC, has the most obvious connection to the
postings regarding electronic civil disobedience, which
instigated imminent, illegal activity, because he was responsible
for posting the content on the Internet. Therefore, given his
level of control over the website, our conclusion that SHAC’s
website coordinated electronic civil disobedience alone requires
the conclusion that Conroy’s actions in this regard do not
warrant First Amendment protection.12
d.

Stepanian

In a recorded telephone conversation with Gazzola,
Stepanian described a protest he coordinated inside the New
12

We address Conroy’s argument that the evidence
connects him to website administration only after the conspiracy
terminated in section V., infra.
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York offices of Deloitte and Touche, Huntingdon’s auditor.
After security refused to admit Stepanian into the building, he
followed a delivery person inside, and spoke to the office
manager. The office manager ejected Stepanian from the
building, at which time other protestors threw paper and
plastered the inside of the building with stickers. Although
Stepanian clearly accepted responsibility for this action in the
phone call with Gazzola, the protest was nonetheless attributed
to “New York activists.” Stepanian himself provided strong
circumstantial evidence of his planning and execution of illegal
protest activity in a phone conversation with Kjonaas. When
Kjonaas asked Stepanian what his plans were, Stepanian replied
that he could not share the information over the phone,
presumably for fear that the phone was wiretapped.
e.

Fullmer

Fullmer, operating under an e-mail address that the
government identified as belonging to him, coordinated illegal
protest activity on behalf of SHAC via a Yahoo message board.
This activity included inciting the readers to participate in
“Black Fax Mondays” against Stephens, Inc. and Bank of New
York. Like Conroy, Fullmer’s speech incited others to commit
illegal acts at a designated time and place, which meets the
Brandenburg standard, removing it from the realm of protected
speech.
f.

Harper

The government primarily argues that Harper coordinated
a SHAC campaign in Seattle, and that he gave speeches
advocating and explaining electronic civil disobedience. During
its summation, the government emphasized Harper’s
coordination of speeches in Seattle, his longstanding friendships
with some of his co-Defendants, and his visit to a Deloitte and
Touche office in Seattle during which it appears he did nothing
illegal.
Harper also gave speeches, including one in which he
explained how to send “black faxes” and wrote an editorial in
which he endorsed militant action. He called Kjonaas to express
his surprise and pleasure with SHAC’s successes, and he emailed Kjonaas asking for speakers to travel to Seattle to speak
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on behalf of the organization and the movement. Harper’s
personal conduct does not cross the line of illegality; to punish
him simply on the basis of his political speeches would run afoul
of the constitution. However, his conduct, as discussed infra,
does provide circumstantial evidence from which a jury could
have reasonably inferred that Harper was involved in a
conspiracy to violate the AEPA. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
U.S. 476, 489 (1993) (“The First Amendment . . . does not
prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements
of a crime or to prove motive or intent.”) Accordingly, the
application of AEPA to him is not unconstitutional.
3.

Conclusion

We hold that the AEPA is not void for vagueness and is
not unconstitutional as-applied to all Defendants.
IV.
We next address Defendants’ contention that the District
Court improperly instructed the jury with regard to the elements
of Count One, Conspiracy to Violate the AEPA. We have
plenary review of the legal standard used by the District Court,
and we review the District Court’s choice of wording for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442,
452 (3d Cir. 1999).
Defendants primarily argue that the District Court
improperly permitted the jury to consider SHAC’s protest
activity against companies associated with Huntingdon, which
were not “animal enterprises,” as evidence of a conspiracy to
violate the AEPA. Defendants point to the legislative history of
the AEPA, noting that it was not until 2006 that the statute
incorporated “damaging” or “causing” a loss to “a person or
entity having a connection to, relationship with, or transactions
with an animal enterprise.” 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(A) (2006).
We disagree with Defendants’ characterization. The
government’s evidence showed that the ultimate object of the
conspiracy was to cause a physical disruption – which the jury
instruction defined as “interference with the normal course of
business or activity” – at Huntingdon resulting in damage to
Huntingdon. In this regard, Defendants’ actions against third
parties associated with Huntingdon properly provided
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circumstantial evidence of Defendants’ conspiracy to violate the
AEPA, even though they were actually prosecuted and convicted
for their conduct toward third parties under the stalking and
telecommunications statutes.
Defendants next argue that the District Court erred when
it instructed the jury that they could convict Defendants if the
jury found only that Defendants intended to cause a “loss of
property” exceeding $10,000. Defendants argue that the proper
instruction would have required the jury to find that Defendants
actually caused a “loss of property” in excess of $10,000. Even
assuming, arguendo, that the District Court’s instruction was
erroneous, the error would have been harmless.
The
government presented ample evidence at trial that Defendants’
protest activity directed at Huntingdon actually caused
Huntingdon a loss well over $10,000. See Section I.B., supra
(noting that the electronic civil disobedience directed toward
Huntingdon cost the company $400,000 in lost business,
$50,000 in staffing costs to repair the computer systems and
bring them back online, and $15,000 to replace computer
equipment).
Defendants next contend that the District Court
improperly instructed the jury that “damage or loss of any
property . . . used by the animal enterprise” does not include
“loss of profits.” Defendants argue that the District Court
should have instructed the jury that they first had to “find
damage or loss of any property used by the animal enterprise,”
or a conspiracy to do so. If the jury found such damage or a
conspiracy to cause such damage, Defendants argue that only
then should the jury have calculated economic damage, which
includes lost profits.
Defendants’ reading of the statute only helps them if the
government did not prove a loss exceeding $10,000, exclusive
of lost profits. As previously noted, Huntingdon had to pay
$15,000 to replace computer equipment after a protest involving
electronic civil disobedience.
We have considered all the remaining arguments the
individual Defendants make regarding errors in the jury
instructions for Count One, and we conclude that no further
discussion is necessary. We therefore conclude that the District
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Court properly instructed the jury with regard to Count One.
V.
The next issue on appeal is whether there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict. We conduct an
“independent review” of the entire record because First
Amendment principles are involved. United States v. Kosma,
951 F.2d 549, 555 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
A.
Count One - Conspiracy to Violate the AEPA
To prove a conspiracy to violate the AEPA, the
government was required to demonstrate the following beyond
a reasonable doubt: (1) that the Defendants conspired, that is,
they agreed with one another and/or with others; (2) to use a
facility in interstate or foreign commerce; (3) for the purpose of
causing physical disruption to the functioning of Huntingdon;
and (4) to intentionally damage or cause the loss of property to
Huntingdon.13 18 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2002). In addition, the
Defendants were charged, under the penalty component of the
statute, with causing economic damage exceeding $10,000. Id.
§ 43(b)(2).
Defendants contend on appeal that there was insufficient
evidence to prove the third and fourth of these elements:
Defendants acted for the purpose of causing physical disruption
to Huntingdon and to intentionally damage or cause the loss of
Huntingdon’s property. The AEPA expressly provides that “the
term ‘physical disruption’ does not include any lawful disruption

13

The District Court, in its charge on the general law of
conspiracy, required the government to prove an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy for each of the conspiracy counts.
However, so far as the AEPA was concerned, the language of the
statute did not require an overt act. See 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2) (2002).
The court should not infer such a requirement. See Whitfield v.
United States, 543 U.S. 209, 213 (2005) (“[W]here Congress had
omitted from the relevant conspiracy provision any language
expressly requiring an overt act, the Court would not read such a
requirement in the statute.”).
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that results from lawful public, governmental, or animal
enterprise employee reaction to the disclosure of information
about an animal enterprise.” 18 U.S.C. § 43(d)(2) (2002). This
exception underpins Defendants’ argument that they agreed to
use only lawful protest activity with the objective of closing
Huntingdon. We note at the outset of this discussion that
Defendants’ sufficiency arguments are largely tied to their
argument that the AEPA was unconstitutional as-applied.
The government need not introduce direct evidence to
establish a conspiratorial agreement. United States v. McKee,
506 F.3d 225, 238 (3d Cir. 2007). Rather, the government can
prove the agreement with circumstantial evidence, “based upon
reasonable inferences drawn from actions and statements of the
conspirators or from the circumstances surrounding the
scheme.” Id. (citations omitted). Defendants in this case
unquestionably agreed to advocate for animal rights as members
and agents of SHAC. However, Defendants cannot be
convicted solely because of their associations, because such a
conviction would clearly run afoul of the First Amendment’s
guarantee of freedom of association. See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v.
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 918-19 (1982); McKee, 506
F.3d at 238.
To establish a conspiracy under these
circumstances, the government must “‘establish that the group
itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a
specific intent to further those illegal aims.’” McKee, 506 F.3d
at 239 (quoting Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920). This
evidence must be judged “according to the strictest law,” or the
“strictissimi juris doctrine.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
However, the government need not show that each and every
member of the conspiracy committed an unlawful act in
furtherance of the conspiracy’s goals.
Even applying this strict standard, we find that the
government provided evidence beyond association to prove the
conspiracy with regard to SHAC, Kjonaas, Gazzola, Conroy,
Harper, Stepanian and Fullmer.
While there is no direct evidence that the Defendants
expressly agreed to participate in the conspiracy and further its
unlawful goals, there is ample circumstantial evidence from
which the jury could have inferred their agreement to do so.
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Kjonaas and Gazzola had leadership positions in SHAC, an
organization that clearly engaged in unprotected activity via its
website.14 Kjonaas and Gazzola were instrumental in the
coordination of all of SHAC’s activities, both legal and illegal.
There is also overwhelming evidence of their constant attempts
to evade law enforcement and cover their tracks: use of
encryption devices and programs to wipe their computer hard
drives; attributing illegal activities to fake organizations and
activists; and the use of pseudonyms. While alone this evidence
is not enough to demonstrate agreement, when viewed in
context, it is circumstantial evidence of their agreement to
participate in illegal activity. See, e.g., United States v.
Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing United
States v. Cohen, 516 F.2d 1358, 1367 (8th Cir. 1975)).
Ample circumstantial evidence demonstrates that Conroy
and Fullmer agreed to participate in this conspiracy. Conroy
resided with Kjonaas and Gazzola in the Somerset, New Jersey
headquarters of SHAC. Using computers located there, he
designed and maintained multiple websites affiliated with
14

SHAC, as a corporation, can act only through its agents.
In this case, Kjonaas was the only true agent of SHAC because
he was the only named officer of the corporation. Given the
relationship between Kjonaas, SHAC, and the events at issue in
this case, a finding that Kjonaas agreed to participate in the
conspiracy clearly permits the imputation of criminal liability to
SHAC. See United States v. Sain, 141 F.3d 463, 474-75 (3d
Cir. 1998) (“If an agent of the corporation conspires with
another individual, the corporation for which the individual is
the agent may be criminally liable.”); Minisohn v. United States,
101 F.2d 477, 478 (3d Cir. 1939) (“It is well settled law that the
guilty intent of officers of a corporation may be imputed to the
corporation itself in order to prove the guilt of the
corporation.”); see also Erik D. Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits
on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution
Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1434, 1447 (2006) (noting that
a corporation may be held liable for an agent’s actions if the
agent acts within the scope of his/her employment and his/her
action is for the benefit of the company, and that this standard
of liability is relatively easy to satisfy).
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SHAC–the primary tools of the campaign against Huntingdon.
He frequently posted on these websites detailed information
regarding when and how SHAC supporters could participate in
illegal campaign activities. These postings at times included
warnings and threats of violence against SHAC’s targets, with
the intent of intimidating those targets into complying with
SHAC’s demands. This strong circumstantial evidence supports
the conclusion that Conroy agreed to participate in the
conspiracy.
Similarly, Fullmer, via the e-mail address
malignantx@aol.com, personally coordinated electronic civil
disobedience via internet message boards. It is inconceivable
that he could now argue that he never agreed to participate in
illegal activity–he personally orchestrated it.
There is sufficient circumstantial evidence from which
the jury could infer that Harper also agreed to participate in this
conspiracy. Harper organized a Seattle branch of SHAC and a
local campaign against Stephens, a company targeted by SHAC.
In a lengthy telephone conversation with Kjonaas, Harper
enthusiastically discussed recent events in the SHAC campaign
and future strategies. He wrote editorials and gave speeches
praising militant tactics and direct action. These included a
speech in Seattle in which he explained how the audience could
send black faxes, a primary tool in SHAC’s campaign. In that
speech Harper declared, “I think that it’s appropriate to have a
militant response . . . to go after them with everything at . . . our
hands. Anything that we have available to use and do our
utmost to shut them down.” (J.A. at 2531.) From this
constellation of evidence the jury could reasonably conclude that
Harper conspired with others and shared the purpose of causing
unlawful physical disruption and damage to property at
Huntingdon.
The circumstantial evidence of Stepanian’s agreement is
not as overwhelming as the evidence against his co-Defendants,
but there is enough to support the jury’s conclusion beyond a
reasonable doubt. Stepanian, like Kjonaas and Gazzola, had a
leadership position within SHAC.
He alluded to his
coordination of illegal activity in a phone call with Kjonaas
when he explained to Kjonaas that he could not explain over an
unprotected phone line what protest activity he had planned for
the following weeks in New York and New Jersey. He worked
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with Kjonaas to attribute illegal activity to sham organizations,
and he led an illegal protest at Deloitte and Touche.15
We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that SHAC,
Kjonaas, Gazzola, Conroy, Stepanian, Harper and Fullmer
agreed to participate in a conspiracy to violate the AEPA.
To the extent that Defendants challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence with regard to the other elements of Count One,
we reject those arguments.16 As we discussed in section IV,
supra, we find that the object of Defendants’ conspiracy was to
cause a physical disruption to Huntingdon, an animal enterprise,
and to intentionally damage or cause the loss of property.
B.
Counts Two, Three, Four, and Five - Conspiracy to Commit
Stalking and Substantive Stalking
SHAC, Kjonaas, Gazzola and Conroy were convicted of

15

We recognize that Deloitte and Touche is not an
“animal enterprise” as defined by the AEPA. We also recognize
that under the 2002 version of the statute, violation of which
Defendants were charged and convicted, participation in a
campaign against Deloitte and Touche and other indirectly
affiliated companies is not, by itself, enough to substantiate a
conspiracy to violate the AEPA. However, with regard to
Defendants’ agreement to participate in illegal activities to
further their goals, we must view the record in its entirety, and
not look only to their agreement to participate in activities
directed against Huntingdon. United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d
473, 481 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.
Migliorino, 238 F.2d 7, 9 (3d Cir. 1956)).
16

Defendants in this case cross-reference portions of their
co-Defendants’ briefs. It is difficult to discern what arguments
each Defendant intended to raise, or more specifically, how to
label them, given the similarities between their arguments
regarding sufficiency of the evidence, their challenges based on
the First Amendment, and the jury instructions.
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conspiracy to commit interstate stalking, in addition to aiding
and abetting substantive interstate stalking of Sally Dillenback,
Marion Harlos, and Robert Harper, respectively.
Interstate stalking is proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2261A.
To prove stalking, the government must establish (1) Defendants
used a facility of interstate commerce; (2) to engage in a course
of conduct with the intent to place a person in reasonable fear of
death or serious bodily injury either to that person or to a partner
or immediate family member; and (3) the course of conduct
actually put that person in reasonable fear of death or serious
bodily injury to himself or his partner or immediate family
member. See, e.g., United States v. Wills, 346 F.3d 476, 493-94
(4th Cir. 2003). To prove a conspiracy to commit interstate
stalking, the government must also prove that the charged
defendants agreed to participate in a conspiracy to commit
interstate stalking. Finally, with regard to “aiding and abetting,”
a defendant is punishable as the principal if the government
establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that either the defendant
committed the stalking or “aid[ed], abet[ted], counsel[ed],
command[ed], induce[d] or procure[d]” the substantive act of
stalking by another person. 18 U.S.C. § 2.
1.

Kjonaas

Kjonaas argues that the government failed to produce
sufficient evidence of his intent to place the victims in
reasonable fear of serious bodily injury or death, as required by
the interstate stalking statute. Specifically, he argues that he
only intended to harass, “make the [victims’] lives miserable,”
cause “emotional distress,” and “embarrass” the victims.
(Kjonaas Br. at 78-79.) He contrasts the intention to inflict this
type of emotional distress with the statute’s requirement that he
intend to put the victim in “reasonable fear of death or bodily
injury.”
We disagree. SHAC invoked Brian Cass’s injuries to
instill fear in others targeted by the campaign; SHAC activists
constantly used ultimatums when they targeted individuals,
threatening “or else” if the companies failed to sever their ties
with Huntingdon; following the Chiron bombing, Kjonaas noted
the escalation in the “severity” of the campaign and warned that
Huntingdon and Chiron should be “very worried.” The SHAC
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website boasted that “anonymous activists” had arranged for an
undertaker to collect a target’s body, and the “Top 20 Terror
Tactics” mentions physical attacks and threats to kill and injure
as effective means of protest. The website discussed Andrew
Baker’s “bloody” California bungalow, with the line, “You can
run, but you can’t hide!” In addition, the SHAC website
celebrated extreme acts of vandalism by posting photographs of
overturned vehicles and houses splattered with red paint.
Kjonaas knew that all of this information was widely available
on the internet, and that when Dillenback, Harlos, and Harper
were targeted, they could easily discern what had happened to
those who came before them and feel intimidated accordingly.
2.

Gazzola and SHAC

Gazzola argues that the government failed to establish
that the alleged threats were communicated to the targets, and
that there was insufficient evidence that the targets’ fear of
bodily harm was reasonable. SHAC also makes the latter
argument.
We can reject these arguments with little discussion.
Gazzola personally stood outside of Robert Harper’s house and
threatened to burn it down, and warned that the police could not
protect him. All of the stalking victims–Sally Dillenback,
Marion Harlos, and Robert Harper–testified that they were
aware that they had been targeted. Dillenback testified that she
received an e-mail in which someone asked her how she would
feel if someone “cut open her son and filled him with poison.”
All the stalking victims testified that they were afraid for their
safety, and the safety of their families, because they knew what
had happened to Brian Cass and others who preceded them in
this campaign.
3.

Conroy

Finally, Conroy argues there was insufficient evidence to
convict him of all stalking-related counts. The crux of his
argument is that he was tied to the conspiracy through his work
administering the website, of which there was proof only after
the 2003 seizure of the computers from SHAC headquarters. He
argues that because the government charged him with
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involvement in a conspiracy that ended in December 2002, his
involvement with SHAC in 2003 does not suffice to convict him
of a conspiracy that had already terminated. With regard to the
substantive stalking counts, Conroy argues that there is
insufficient evidence that he posted information about
Dillenback, Harlos, and Robert Harper on the website, and that
the government cannot prove that he was even aware of the
nature of the campaign against those individuals.
Conroy’s argument ignores evidence of his involvement
beyond the evidence that he was the primary user of computers
used to administer SHAC’s websites.
There was evidence
that Conroy managed SHAC’s website as early as August 2001,
which predates the start date of the government’s charged
conspiracy. Documents that contained confidential business
records for Bank of New York were posted in August 2001, and
those same documents were found in a folder labeled with
Conroy’s name in SHAC’s office. In addition, Conroy created
his PGP account, which he used to communicate with his coDefendants and other SHAC activists, in January 2002. The
record is also peppered with evidence of his involvement with
the campaign well before the termination of the conspiracy in
December 2002.
With regard to Conroy’s arguments about his lack of
personal involvement in the stalking, we note that the
government charged him with aiding and abetting, and not as a
principal. Given Conroy’s overall course of conduct, the jury
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Conroy
maintained the website, the primary tool that made the stalking
possible. The website not only communicated the victims’
personal information, but the website also disseminated the
information that made the victims’ fears reasonable: threats that
people associated with Huntingdon would be treated like Brian
Cass, photos of extreme vandalism, ultimatums, and threats.
Conroy’s involvement as website administrator, which the jury
could conclude predated the end of the conspiracy, made the
stalking, if not the entire campaign, possible.
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C.
Count Six - Conspiracy to Use a Telecommunications Device
to Abuse, Threaten and Harass
SHAC, Kjonaas, Gazzola, Conroy and Harper were
convicted of conspiracy to use a telecommunications device to
abuse, threaten and harass, in violation of 47 U.S.C. §
223(a)(1)(c). SHAC and Harper challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence on this count. We find that SHAC’s arguments are
frivolous, and do not require a response. 17 We reject Harper’s
arguments for the reasons discussed above in reference to Count
One.
VI.
Defendants raise a host of additional arguments
pertaining to evidentiary objections and challenges to the
reasonableness of their sentences. We have carefully reviewed
their arguments, and we find them to be without merit.
However, we note that all parties concede, and we agree, that
the District Court erred when it failed to devise a payment
schedule for the $1,000,001 in restitution. See United States v.
Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 201 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We have held that
a district court commits plain error when, having ordered full
restitution, it fails to state on the record the manner and schedule
of payments after taking into account the defendant’s financial
resources.”). As a result, we remand to the District Court for
that purpose.
VII.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the convictions
and sentences of Defendants SHAC, Kevin Kjonaas, Lauren

17

SHAC argues (1) that facsimile transmissions do not
fall within the ambit of the telecommunications statute; (2) even
if the transmission of “black faxes” does fall within 47 U.S.C.
§ 223(a)(1)(c), there was insufficient evidence of an intent to
harass; and (3) that the telecommunications statute applies only
to persons initiating the transmission and not to those who
provide information that describes and directs the illegal
transmissions.
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Gazzola, Jacob Conroy, Andrew Stepanian, Joshua Harper and
Darius Fullmer. Finally, we remand to the District Court to
create a payment schedule for the restitution ordered.

FISHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I write separately to express disagreement with my
colleagues’ conclusions regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict the Defendants on Count One, the
conspiracy to violate the Animal Enterprise Protection Act
(AEPA). Although I agree with most of the majority’s analysis
as to why the AEPA is constitutional on its face and as applied
to the Defendants, I part company with my colleagues in
assessing whether the Government in fact proved that the
Defendants committed a conspiracy to violate the AEPA. This
issue, though narrow, is nonetheless significant for this case. In
light of the statutory prohibitions of the AEPA and the evidence
that the Government presented at trial, I cannot conclude that
there was sufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to convict the
Defendants of conspiring to violate the AEPA. Therefore, I
would reverse the convictions as to all Defendants on this count.
The majority states that the issue in controversy on appeal
is whether there was sufficient evidence that Defendants
conspired to cause “physical disruption to the functioning of
Huntingdon” and to “intentionally damage or cause the loss of
property to Huntingdon.” Majority Op. at Part V.A. I would
frame the central issue differently, instead asking whether there
was sufficient evidence that the Defendants formed an
agreement, the purpose of which would violate the AEPA, and
had the specific intent to further this illegal goal. See Salinas v.
United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) (“A conspirator must
intend to further an endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy
all of the elements of a substantive criminal offense, but it
suffices that he adopt the goal of furthering or facilitating the
criminal endeavor.”). While this distinction is subtle, its effect
on how one views the Government’s evidence is not.
In reviewing the Defendants’ challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government and ask whether any rational trier
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of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
318-19 (1979). Here, the version of the AEPA under which the
Defendants were convicted prescribes punishment for anyone
who
“(1) . . . uses or causes to be used the mail or any
facility in interstate or foreign commerce for the
purpose of causing physical disruption to the
functioning of an animal enterprise; and
(2) intentionally damages or causes the loss of any
property (including animals or records) used by
the animal enterprise, or conspires to do so.”
18 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2002). Accordingly, to prove a conspiracy to
violate this statute, the Government needed to demonstrate that
the Defendants formed an agreement to “cause[] physical
disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise” and to
“damage[] or cause[] the loss of any property . . . used by the
animal enterprise,” and that each Defendant had the specific
intent to further this agreement.18
I agree with the majority that proving a conspiracy, in
general, requires the Government to establish an agreement
among the group to accomplish unlawful goals and the specific
intent on the part of each individual to further those illegal
goals, see Majority Op. at Part V.A. (quoting United States v.
McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2007)); nonetheless, to prove
a particular type of conspiracy requires establishing that the
goals were ones prohibited by a specific law. That is, a goal can
only be considered unlawful in reference to a particular
prohibition. Here, the prohibition at issue is physically
disrupting an animal enterprise and intending to cause damage
or loss to its property in violation of the AEPA.
In discussing the Defendants’ insufficiency of the

18

The parties do not dispute that the Internet qualifies as a
facility in interstate commerce and that Huntingdon meets the
definition of an animal enterprise. See 18 U.S.C. § 43(d)(1)(A)
(2002) (defining “animal enterprise” as a “commercial . . . enterprise
that uses animals for . . . research[] or testing”).
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evidence argument, the majority simply states: “[W]e find that
the object of Defendants’ conspiracy was to cause a physical
disruption to Huntingdon, an animal enterprise, and to
intentionally damage or cause the loss of property.” Majority
Op. at Part V.A. As support for this statement, the majority
refers back to an earlier portion of the opinion, in which it
addresses the Defendants’ argument that the District Court
incorrectly instructed the jury on the elements of the conspiracy
to violate the AEPA charge. However, the portion of the
opinion to which the majority refers simply asserts, without any
concrete examples or support from the record, that the
“government’s evidence showed that the ultimate object of the
conspiracy was to cause a physical disruption – which the jury
instruction defined as ‘interference with the normal course of
business or activity’ – at Huntingdon resulting in damage to
Huntingdon.” Majority Op. at Part IV. I fail to see how the
evidence relied upon by the Government and recounted by the
majority establishes that the object of the conspiracy was to
cause physical disruption at Huntingdon.
On the contrary, the evidence that the majority describes
throughout its opinion consists primarily of either conduct that
was directed at companies affiliated with Huntingdon – such as
an investment banking company (Stephens, Inc.), a
pharmaceutical client (Chiron), an insurance broker (Marsh,
Inc.), and an auditor (Deloitte & Touche) – and the employees
of those companies – e.g., Sally Dillenback, Marion Harlos, and
Robert Harper – or “illegal activity” in a very general sense.
More specifically, to highlight a few examples, the majority
discusses “a massive direct action campaign” targeted at
Stephens, Inc., which involved a protest with “hundreds of
activists attempting to access Stephens’s, w ebsite
simultaneously and repeatedly in an effort to shut it down”; “a
protest of approximately twenty people at a New York office of
Deloitte and Touche,” during which “protestors threw flyers”
and “chanted and plastered stickers”; the coordination of “Black
Fax Mondays” targeted at “Stephens, Inc. and Bank of New
York”; “the extensive use of various encryption devices and
programs used to erase incriminating data from [certain
Defendants’] computer hard drives”; and the publication of “the
personal information of Huntingdon employees and companies
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associated with Huntingdon for the purpose of encouraging
harassment, intimidation, and threats.” While I of course do not
condone this type of conduct, and I do not dispute that this
evidence sufficed to convict the various Defendants on the
interstate stalking and the telecommunications harassment
counts, I fail to see any evidence of an agreement to cause
physical disruption to Huntingdon – as opposed to other nonanimal enterprise companies affiliated with Huntingdon – or to
cause damage or loss to property used by Huntingdon.19
Notably, at the time the Defendants were prosecuted, the
AEPA did not criminalize harassment of employees of an
animal enterprise or employees of companies affiliated with an
animal enterprise. Rather, in 2006 Congress amended the
statute to authorize punishment for anyone who:
“uses . . . any facility of interstate or foreign
commerce –
(1)

for the purpose of damaging or
interfering with the operations of
an animal enterprise; and

(2)

in connection with such purpose –
(A)

intentionally damages or
causes the loss of any real or
personal property (including

19

Perhaps the best evidence of an agreement to violate the
AEPA that the majority cites is its reference to “posts coordinating
electronic civil disobedience with the goal of flooding the
Huntingdon servers, fax machines, and phones, as well as those of
companies affiliated with Huntingdon.” Majority Op. at Part III.A.2.
This evidence is stronger than the rest because it involves conduct
actually directed at Huntingdon as opposed to only third parties. But
without any cite to the record or specific examples of the Defendants
targeting Huntingdon, this reference is nothing more than an
unsupported characterization of the evidence that the Government
now offers of what it presented at trial. Moreover, even if record
support for targeting Huntingdon’s servers, fax machines, and phones
existed, this conduct is hard to fit within the language of the AEPA,
which prohibits causing a physical disruption not an electronic
disruption.
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animals or records) used by
an animal enterprise, or any
real or personal property of
a person or entity having a
connection to, relationship
with, or transactions with an
animal enterprise;
(B)

intentionally places a person
in reasonable fear of the
death of, or serious bodily
injury to that person, a
member of the immediate
family . . . of that person, or
a spouse or intimate partner
of that person by a course of
conduct involving threats,
acts of vandalism, property
damage, criminal trespass,
harassment, or intimidation;
or

(C)

conspires or attempts to do
so.”

18 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2006) (emphasis added). Significantly, the
amended act allows liability to be premised upon causing
damage to the property of any person, or entity, having a
connection with an animal enterprise and threatening, harassing,
or intimidating any such person. Additionally, the amended act
does not require that the defendant cause “physical disruption”
and instead prohibits “interfering” with the operations of an
animal enterprise. Thus I acknowledge that the Government’s
case against these Defendants would be much stronger if they
were prosecuted under the current version of the AEPA.
However, the version of the AEPA that the Defendants were
charged with violating did not prohibit mere interference with
the operations of an animal enterprise nor did it proscribe
targeting companies and employees that were affiliated with an
animal enterprise and, therefore, proof that the Defendants
engaged in this type of conduct was not a sufficient basis for
convicting them under the AEPA.
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As the majority discusses in the context of the void for
vagueness arguments, “Defendants were charged with intending
to cause physical disruption to the functioning of an animal
enterprise and to cause economic damages exceeding $10,000.”
Majority Op. at Part III.A.1. While I would add, to be precise,
that the AEPA requires an intent to cause both physical
disruption to the animal enterprise and damage or loss of
property of the animal enterprise (amounting to at least
$10,000), a finding of specific intent is clearly required to
convict the Defendants of violating this statute.20 Therefore, it
is not enough to show intent to engage in illegal actions; rather,
the Government needed to prove specific intent to further a goal
that, if accomplished, would violate the AEPA in order to
convict for the conspiracy charged in Count One. But, due to
the lack of evidence demonstrating the Defendants’ specific
intent to facilitate the physical disruption of and damage to or
loss of property used by Huntingdon, the majority relies on only
general statements about the Defendants’ illegal activity. For
example, the majority states that Kjonaas violated the AEPA
through his “involvement in and coordination of [more
instances] of illegal activity than we could possibly recount
here”; Gazzola was “instrumental in the planning and execution
of SHAC’s illegal activities,” having “repeatedly employed
illegal tactics” as part of the strategy to close down Huntingdon;
Conroy “instigated imminent, illegal activity” by posting
information regarding civil electronic disobedience on SHAC’s
website; Stepanian “provided strong circumstantial evidence of
his planning and execution of illegal protest activity” based on
a conversation during which Stepanian told Kjonaas he could
not share information over the phone; Harper “coordinated a
SHAC campaign in Seattle,” indicated his “pleasure with
SHAC’s successes,” “gave speeches” on how to send “black
faxes” and “wrote an editorial in which he endorsed militant

20

Specific intent is necessary to demonstrate a substantive
violation of the AEPA and is required to prove a conspiracy of any
sort. See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65; United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d
88, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1988).
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action” 21 ; and Fullmer “coordinated illegal protest activity on
behalf of SHAC via a Yahoo message board,” which provided
information about transmitting black faxes to Stephens, Inc. and
Bank of New York. Majority Op. at Part III.A.2. Of course, the
Government, and not the majority, is at fault for this lack of
evidence of the Defendants’ specific intent to violate the AEPA
because it failed to adduce the necessary evidence of this
purpose and intent at trial.
In sum, even when the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the Government, it simply does not establish
that the Defendants entered into an agreement, the purpose of
which, if accomplished, would violate the statutory provisions
of the AEPA, and that they likewise had the specific intent to
further this particular goal. While the Government’s evidence
tended to prove that the Defendants conspired together to put
economic pressure on Huntingdon to close its facilities by
targeting companies that did business with Huntingdon, as well
as their employees, and furthered this goal through a campaign
of intimidation and harassment, the Government’s evidence did
not prove an agreement to cause physical disruption to
Huntingdon and damage to property it used. For this reason, I
would reverse each Defendant’s conviction on Count One,
because no rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime of conspiracy to violate the AEPA beyond
a reasonable doubt.

21

The majority concedes that “Harper’s personal conduct does
not cross the line of illegality; [and] to punish him simply on the basis
of his political speeches would run afoul of the constitution.”
Majority Op. at Part III.A.2. Nonetheless, the majority finds that
Harper’s conduct “does provide circumstantial evidence from which
a jury could have reasonably inferred that Harper was involved in a
conspiracy to violate the AEPA.” Id. In my view the majority’s
statement that “Harper’s personal conduct does not cross the line of
illegality” does not distinguish him from the other Defendants
because there is likewise no direct evidence that the other Defendants
“expressly agreed to participate in the conspiracy and further its
unlawful goals.” Majority Op. at Part V.A. I disagree that there is
sufficient circumstantial evidence to allow a jury to infer a conspiracy
to violate the AEPA on the part of Harper or the other Defendants.
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